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Show Trials in China: After Tiananmen Square
MARK FINDLAY*
INTRODUCTION
After the military massacre in Tiananmen Square on 4 June it came as no
surprise that the nominated 'rioters and counter revolutionaries' would soon
be paraded before the courts. Even in the People's Republic of China, where a
formal criminal court structure is a comparatively recent addition to the social
control framework, the trial process is being employed as an immediate state
response to community disjuncture and political challenge.
To observe that the processes of 'criminal justice' frequently are well used to
legitimate what might otherwise be viewed as military repression or political
retribution is hardly novel.' Balbus identifies a number of advantages which
might flow from using the courts to deal with what the state defines as
politically marginal violence. In particular, he highlights the claims over
definitions, made all the more contentious through the institutional
application of 'the law':
One of the central tenets of law is that crime is not an entity in fact but an entity in law.
Violent activities therefore have to be fitted into predefined categories in law. [In legal
terms] the political character of motivations is irrelevant. The effectiveness of the process,
of course, will depend on the extent of political involvement and the ideological coherence
of the participants.
2
This latter point is as applicable to the controllers and their mechanisms of
control as it is to the controlled.
When considering the criminal trial as a weapon for the reassertion of
political power, one level of analysis centres on the accused. By having a court
impose a criminal sanction through the trial process, the stated political
motivations of the 'offender' are delegitimized. This, of course, depends on
whether the courts concerned, and the procedures they adopt, are seen by the
community as bearing legitimate authority. Without this they are simply
another aspect of the state's power to intimidate.
Further on this level of analysis is the realization that through the exercise of
state-sanctioned violence the court can attempt to undermine the allegiances
of those who were previously bound together in a common political struggle.
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As long as those participants who are brought before the court are
criminalized and punished, their ideological sympathizers will be less able to
provide them with public support. Even if their criminality is not generally
accepted, their supporters will be compromised into the same discourse.
Ironically, as Hillyard suggests, the concentration is on ensuring that the
authorities 'respect the suspect's rights', 3 or consider appeals and clemency. In
this manner the trial is used to turn a political conflict into a legal-factional
conflict and as such is more consistent with the long-term legitimacy of the
state.
When considering the normative power of legal institutions, Habermas
identifies its potential towards legitimacy. He recognizes that the institutional
application of legal form will rely for its potency on more than form:
... the technical legal form alone, pure legality, will not be able to guarantee recognition in
the long run, if the system cannot be legitimated independently of the legal form of the
existing authority.... Moreover, the organizations which are responsible for making and
applying the law are in no way legitimated by the legality of the modes of procedure (or
vice versa), but likewise by general interpretation which supports the system of authority
as a whole.
4
These 'general interpretations' are what recently and so forceably have been
challenged in China. This paper intends to explore the motivations behind the
use of legal institutions to bolster state authority, where that very authority
which normally legitimizes such legal institutions is itself widely condemned.
In particular, in the case of show trials, often their purpose is to invest
otherwise unpopular state action with the appearance of respectability. Is it,
then, the legal institution or the 'legality' it is said to translate which is the
legitimator? Or, as I would suggest is the present case in China, are legal
institutions deferred to in some ritual propitiation - as a material attempt to
colonize the ideological 'common ground' of justice and lay claim to
normality through the processes of institutional good order. In China the use
of show trials is far more intriguing than the simple masking and mystifying
functions of the criminal law. It is the state's intention here (the reverse of
Thompson's conclusion') that the law and its agencies should appear to have
an 'independent history and logic of evolution' which separates them from the
political conflict to which they are applied. It is by resort to the application of
force through the criminal trial that the Government of the People's Republic
of China is advertising its reassertion of authority without visible reliance on
unmitigated force. How this then compromises the chosen legal institutions in
the long term is the other, and perhaps more profound, focus for analysis.
SHOW TRIALS
Brown and Neal6 identify media treatment as the essential ingredient of a
show trial. The purpose is publicity. The show is visual and verbal. It is
directed against a nominated 'criminal', and it is played out in the courtroom
through the language of the law. Features of a show trial which influence its
political utility include (i) the portrayal of the criminal; (ii) the significance of
the crime in a community sense; (iii) the public confession; (iv) the propriety of
court procedures; (v) the remonstration of the judge; (vi) the finality of the
verdict; (vii) the severity of the punishment; (viii) expressions of community
approval; (ix) concurrent and supportive media coverage; (x) similarity with
other trials.
To debate whether the accused should be before the courts in the first place
is to misunderstand the reality of show trials. The state controls the labelling
process. It can designate offence categories, construe certain behaviour as
criminal, identify and apprehend offenders, and ignore surrounding circum-
stances which might defuse the representation of criminality. Show trials can
process those who seem undoubtedly criminal as well as those whose acts bear
no objective resemblance to crimes. Again, in this regard the analysis should
not focus simply on the accused, except in so far as the nature of their
behaviour might further compromise the probity of judicial intervention.
The audience intended to be reached by the show trial is an important
consideration when examining the immediate and extended purposes for the
display. Looking at the intended audience will also place in context the means
chosen through which the trial is publicized. And it is the novelty of the
manner in which the trial is publicized, more than any actual feature of the
trial itself, which constitutes the 'show' classification.
THE SHANGHAI THREE
On 15 June Chinese television showed the trial of three workers who were
alleged to have burnt a train carriage at an intersection in the city. The
locomotive had, only moments before, ploughed through a group of
demonstrators blocking the track in protest over the Beijing repression. Six of
the demonstrators were killed as a result.
The three men were found guilty of rioting and obstructing railway traffic
by the Shanghai Intermediate People's Court, and were sentenced to death. In
passing judgment the court described their crime of destroying public
transport equipment as being 'extremely serious'. 'We will punish them
heavily and as soon as possible', the judge was quoted as saying.
The South China Morning Post observed that 'yesterday's trial in Shanghai
was carefully orchestrated to make it clear that the accused had nothing to do
with the student movement, but were local hoodlums and thugs, taking
advantage of the disruption to cause trouble' .7
The first accused to go on trial, Xu Guoming, was seen by viewers with his
head bowed, humbly confessing his crimes before the panel of judges and the
packed court. It was reported 8 that people outside the law courts at the time of
the trial seemed convinced that the proceedings were not a fabricated show
trial but a genuine prosecution of known criminals.
It is usual practice in Chinese criminal justice that capital sentences are
executed immediately after they are handed down. However, in this case the
prisoners were given three days in which to appeal to a higher court. On 21
June the Higher People's Court stated that 'there are no legal reasons for
mitigating their punishment'. Shanghai radio, in announcing the appeal
court's decision to proceed with the executions, said that 'The Higher People's
Court affirmed that the facts verified in the original judgments are clear, the
evidence is conclusive, and the determination of the crimes and the sentence
are not inappropriate.' As a result the three men were immediately shot in turn
in the back of the head.
The reaction to the execution from western nations was universally
condemnatory. Many governments observed that the punishment did not
seem to fit the crime. Others saw the killings as further evidence of the People's
Republic of China's vengeful repression of legitimate democratic aspirations.
The discourse of international criticism related to political rather than legal
imperatives.9
As for China's official position on the executions, the Prime Minister Li
Peng declared that:
China will handle the small minority of criminals who have infringed upon the criminal
code entirely according to the law and legal procedures. It will adopt a tolerant attitude to
adequately handle the large majority of people who took part in demonstrations, sit-ins,
and hunger strikes - including those who have said and done radical things. 10
The Hong Kong press have made recent reference to sentencing policy in the
People's Republic of China as regards the punishment of political protest:
Far from bowing to international pressure to show leniency towards offenders, China's
Supreme Court has issued an uncompromising statement demanding they [the protesters]
all receive swift and severe punishment. In a circular to all courts in the country, the courts
were told they 'must swiftly try the cases involving counter-revolutionary ringleaders and
serious criminals who beat, smashed, looted, burned, and killed, and severely punish the
culprits according to the law'.
Six others accused in the Shanghai incident went on trial on 21 June and
escaped the death sentence. Shanghai television later reported that they were
convicted and gaoled. One received a life term, another is to serve twelve years
imprisonment, and the rest were given lesser terms. The Shanghai daily
newspaper Wen Hui Bao, in a brief description of the trial of one of these
defendants, referred to his inciting demonstrators to revolt. He was reported
to have shouted at the crowd while brandishing shoes: 'I'm a student 1' at the
Railroad Institute. Our comrades were crushed by the train, here are their
shoes.'
THE POWER OF TELEVISION
Much of the national and international outrage arising from the Beijing
massacre arose as a consequence of the dramatic television film footage shot
that evening in Tiananmen Square. With the televising of all aspects of the
criminal justice process as it moves against the dissenters, the Government of
the People's Republic of China has sought to harness the power of the visual
image for its own purposes. Television was initially used graphically to
publicize the political protest, then to identify the protesters, and finally to
broadcast the punishment. Within these various concerns can be found both a
challenge to the legitimacy of the state, as well as an undermining of the
motivations for protest.
The 'Shanghai Three' were among ten people arrested soon after they were
seen on local television throwing petrol bombs into the carriages and attacking
police officers and fire fighters. An isolated reaction to this was the reported
statement from one woman outside the courthouse where the trial took place:
'We all saw what they did, they are criminals and should be punished.'1 2
It might be said that televised arrests and courtroom proceedings are intended
to affect the citizen in the same way as public executions. Not only is justice
seen to be done but its dreadful consequences await. With justice flows fear.
There can be little doubt that these judicial scare tactics have had their
deterrent effect on 'yesterday's' demonstrators. And if the rest of the
community can be convinced that those on display are only a small bunch of
the riotous element, then the bloodletting will be a warning that future official
clemency was bought at a price. While there might be little general sympathy
for the sacrificial condemned, the shared concern will be 'Who's next?'
A worker was shown on Shanghai television on 17 June being interrogated
by military police for his part in organizing strikes and distributing anti-
government propaganda. Chinese central television has shown scores of student
activists being rounded up by provincial security officers. But all this has been
selected. As much as informed observeres hold the view that the Government
would not sanction the execution of student leaders not directly linked to the
killing of soldiers or police, the publicizing of their arrest and questioning is a
statement that the law will not tolerate what it defines as disorder.
As with any televised show, the sequencing of events here has been
important for the Government. At first, arrests, interrogations, trials, and
verdicts were all broadcast. Even the sentences have been executed in public.
These sentences have been maximum. With the passage of time fewer stages of
the process have been displayed, fewer trials have been detailed, and the
sentences have been reduced. Why? As regards the last point, one might see
mercy as the reward for contrition and co-operation. However, a more
strategic reason for the slowly drawn curtain is that the state can only tolerate
the exposure of its operations within limitations, even for its own purposes.
Further, the intimidation involved in not knowing takes on far greater
significance when it follows on from the full display. Finally, with a return to
secrecy comes the appearance of normality.
THE SHOW IN PART
On 15 June the midday news on China television announced the first trials of
protesters following the massacre. In this report there was a failure to disclose
the sentences imposed by a court in Chang-chun in the north-eastern Jilin
province. The broadcast indicated that 'twenty-six ruffians were publicly tried
• . . [the defendants] who stopped traffic and advocated a strike amongst
workers all received proper punishment.' The report also referred to the arrest
of a senior leader of the independent student union saying he 'organized
several demonstrations, shouted reactionary slogans, and wrote counter-
revolutionary posters'.
Five days after this broadcast Chinese radio announced that officials in the
north-east city of Jinan, in Shandong province, held a mass trial for forty-five
people accused of taking part in protests there, and sentenced an unspecified
number to death.
In an article entitled '200 activists held as hunt intensifies', the South China
Morning Post catalogued arrests, detentions, trials, and executions of
workers, students, 'counter revolutionaries', 'ruffians', and 'activists'
throughout China. The sources for the article come from all branches of the
official media in the People's Republic of China (for example, the People's
Daily, state radio, Beijing television). (Despite the limitations of what was a
wire service report, it would appear that the original news coverage of the
events referred to in this article was limited, selective, and generalized.13
PURPOSES OF THE SHOW
From a state perspective there will be immediate and longer-term imperatives
behind the broadcast of legal intervention to control political dissent. These
will encompass the usual intentions for the application of the criminal
sanction. The state wishes to reinforce its offence categories through the
identification and punishment of offenders. It may even aspire to the
criminalization of a class of behaviour through the selective punishment of
some of its members. The selection of those for punishment may rely on
political rather than legal considerations. Therefore for the first few weeks of
reprisals in the courts the Government of the People's Republic of China was
at pains to emphasize that those executed were not dissident students.
Specific and general deterrence are obvious rationales for the practice of the
courts in imposing swift and severe punishments. In so doing public
retribution for the disorder arising from the protests is invoked.
But there is more to the show trials and the particular forms they have taken
than the general rationales for the imposition of punishment. Were this not so,
then there would have been no need to step away from the normal processes of
criminal justice in the People's Republic of China. I would suggest that the
timing, the sequencing, the means of publicizing, the language employed for the
purpose, and the selective return to secrecy collectively suggest a complex
political purpose. In order to understand this more fully one needs to appreciate
the position of criminal justice agencies within the state framework of the
People's Republic of China, and their relationship with the wider community.
It is no great revelation for citizens of the People's Republic of China to
witness in recent days the criminal courts in China acting as obvious organs
for state repression. The Government would not have feared such disclosure.
Chinese political organization is not predicated upon a 'separation of powers'
model. There is no independent judiciary. The decisions of the Party's central
committee would naturally be given effect by the public security organs, 14
the courts, and the executioners, as much as they would be by the army.
However, this close relationship between the state and the agencies of
criminal justice is still represented so as not to compromise the inviolability
and symbolic autonomy of the law. As much as is the case in bourgeois
democratic states, the Government of the People's Republic of China
legislates for the law while speaking as if the 'law' stands outside state
interference. The law is the 'law', and in this call is the recognition that
if the law is 'on your side' then your actions are legitimate. The state can
control the law in an institutional or an organizational sense, but in order to
maximize law's potential to legitimate state action, the state cannot seem to be
the law.
It was military force which was the Government's final answer to the
protesters in Tiananmen Square. And yet, to maintain the appearance of
legitimate control, the response through martial law had to be temporary.
Recourse to the process of criminal justice was a public statement that the
return to order in a wider sense was to be achieved through the law. The
military response had been public in its display. In turn, the adverse effect of
that response was to be neutralized through a brief over-exposure to the
mechanisms of the law at work restoring order.
There are also significant dangers in a prolonged reliance on the influence of
show trials. As with the spectacle of the scaffold, exposing the harsher and
more arbitrary operations of the criminal sanction to wide public scrutiny may
not appear as a re-establishing ofjustice, but rather as a reactivation of power.
The law and its institutions may continue to be viewed as an inseparable
extension of state power.
A 'SYSTEM TO ADMINISTER ILLEGALITIES DIFFERENTIALLY'1
Apart from speculation regarding the purpose and influence of recent show
trials in China, there can be little doubt that the trials have meant a more
public profile for the administration of criminal justice in the People's
Republic of China, both within its own borders and internationally. The role
of the courts in the future may be affected by this. Their existence within the
community may be redefined. The social control potential of the criminal
sanction may be more generally apprehended. But what has this meant for the
way in which the community in China is now used in its own regulation? In
societies such as those which have been largely concealed, what will be the
ramifications for the community which is called to observe authority in
operation?
Foucault gives the following analysis of the role of the crowd in public
executions. I would argue that it is applicable to an understanding of the
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community observation of these recent show trials in the People's Republic of
China:
Not only must people know, they must see with their own cyes. Because they may be made
to be afraid; but also because they must be the witnesses, the guarantors, and because they
must to a certain extent take part in it.
1 6
So many of those who watched the trials also no doubt took part in, or at
least sympathized with, the protest. They are now required by the state to take
at least secondary responsibility in its repression. What they have seen and not
resisted can be taken by the state as having at least their acquiescence. And in a
nation where participation in government and actual collective political
responsibility rarely ventures out of the realm of ideology, this endeavour at
gaining legitimacy through public display reflects back as much on the
Government as it does on the governed.
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